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Abstract
Irish policy towards foreign direct investment has evolved since the 1950s as a
strategy driven primarily by the use of fiscal incentives to enhance the
profitability of locating in Ireland, with grants as required to achieve a particular
bargaining advantage in competing against alternative international locations.
Our empirical analysis of European firms in Ireland suggests that the investment
incentives offered appear to have led to significant gross job gains in the
targeted high-tech sectors, as proxied here by the Metals & Engineering and
Chemicals sectors.  However, these gross gains have not translated into net
gains of a similar magnitude.
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Section I: Introduction
Over the past forty years the Republic of Ireland, hereafter referred to as
Ireland, has pursued an industrial strategy characterised by (i) promoting export-
led-growth in Irish manufacturing through various financial supports and fiscal
incentives, and (ii) encouraging foreign companies to establish manufacturing
plants in Ireland, producing specifically for export markets.  As a consequence
of this strategy, any comparison of the Irish economy with other economies in
the European Union (EU) immediately notes the enormous significance of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Irish manufacturing sector and the
manufacturing sector’s very high export ratio, especially among foreign-owned
companies (see Foley and McAleese, 1991).
FDI has played a crucial role in the overall development of the Irish
manufacturing sector over three decades.  Until the mid-1960s Ireland had a
highly protected economy with some of the highest rates of effective protection
of any economy in the world (McAleese, 1971).  In particular, these tariffs
protected Irish manufacturing industry against imports from the UK.  Reductions
in tariffs began in 1966 as a consequence of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area
Agreement, and the process of tariff reduction was eventually completed in
1978, following a five-year adjustment after Ireland joined the European
Economic Community (EEC).  The scale of structural adjustment necessary to
adjust to free trade was on a par with that undertaken by many developing
economies over the past decade under the auspices of the structural adjustment
programmes of the IMF and the World Bank.  In the absence of FDI, the
reduction of high tariffs in Ireland would have required a massive devaluation
against sterling, when policy at the time was fully committed to maintaining that
link at parity.  The scale of FDI coupled with some restructuring support for
import-substituting Irish firms allowed the exchange rate to be maintained, and2
an inevitable shake out in the indigenous sector to take place without any
massive decline in total jobs in manufacturing.
Furthermore, FDI has assisted in the process of adjustment within the
manufacturing sector and across geographic regions.  The sectoral composition
of FDI (with the exception of investment from the UK) is less concentrated on
traditional and food-sector activities than that of indigenous manufacturing, and
thus the growth of the FDI component in manufacturing has meant that the share
of these activities in total manufacturing output has declined over the past thirty
years.  The extent of restructuring is more apparent the lower the level of
sectoral dis-aggregation.  In terms of regional employment, FDI became a
vehicle for dispersing manufacturing employment across the country, and away
from the traditional manufacturing bases in Dublin and Cork (Killen and Ruane,
1993).  Since the Irish economy was still heavily dependent on agricultural
employment in the 1960s, the regional dispersal of foreign-owned firms created
new jobs in regions where existing employment opportunities were declining.
While the focus of this paper is on FDI, some reference is made to
indigenous industry in order to establish a benchmark against which we can
assess the impact of foreign-owned firms.
1  We concentrate on FDI in the
manufacturing sector, as the sector where FDI has hitherto had its greatest
impact and we do not analyse foreign investment in service activities.  In the
context of the manufacturing sector we assess the major impact of foreign-
owned industries in Ireland by focusing primarily on the associated employment
                                               
1  Developments in the indigenous sector, however, cannot be seen as indicating what would have
happened overall in the absence of the FDI which occurred.  In practice, the outcome could not have
been such because the structural adjustments to free trade without FDI would have required macro
interventions, which would have altered the environment faced by the indigenous sector.
Furthermore, the presence of FDI companies may have had some negative impact on indigenous
firms, say through crowding out especially in the factor markets, or some positive impact, say
through generating additional markets for the products of indigenous firms, enhancing the level of
technology in use and in improving the levels of management etc. in the manufacturing sector.3
because employment has always been the major target of the policy makers and
we have an employment time series which allows us to distinguish some
elements of sectoral dynamics.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we look at the
characteristics of the policy which has been used to promote FDI and in Section
3 we look at how policy is implemented.  In Section 4 we examine the overall
impact of FDI in Ireland in terms of employment, focusing in particular on
European-sourced FDI, distinguishing the UK, Germany and a residual category
“Other European”.  Finally, in Section 5 we consider some of the current
concerns about industrial policy in Ireland.
Section II: Key Characteristics of Irish Policy towards FDI
The decision to promote FDI actively in the 1950s represented a
dramatic change in policy for the Irish economy.
2  In the period dating from the
1930s, when the Irish economy introduced high rates of tariff protection on
manufactured goods, FDI had been legislatively prohibited directly through the
Control of Manufactures Acts.  The purpose of these Acts was to ensure that
indigenous ‘infant’ industry would benefit from the protectionist strategy and in
particular that UK firms would not benefit by establishing manufacturing plants
in the protected Irish market into which they had previously been exporting.
3
The change in the 1950s can be seen as Ireland’s finally managing to de-couple
the link between FDI and its colonial past, as hitherto the presence of FDI
companies was seen by many as evidence that Ireland had not established its
economic independence from the UK (see Lee, 1989, c.5; O'Malley, 1989, cc.4-
                                               
2  There are various extant reviews of policy with regards to FDI, the most recent substantial one being
found in Foley and McAleese (1991).  Other recent commentaries include O’Sullivan (1995) and
Ruane (1991).
3  UK-owned firms which had already established in Ireland prior to 1932 were not forced to leave, so
that there was a considerable amount of UK FDI in the 1950s.  Indeed in 1975, UK-owned firms
accounted for over 13 % of total manufacturing employment in Ireland.4
5).  From this time onwards, attitudes in Ireland to FDI, irrespective of source,
have typically been extraordinarily positive right across the socio-political
spectrum.
Employment Focus
The change from an anti- to pro-FDI strategy was driven primarily by the
real failure of the pre-war protectionist strategy to generate a viable
manufacturing sector, which was capable of providing enough jobs to counteract
the falling number of agricultural jobs in rural areas.  Indeed the highly protected
‘infant’ industries established in the 1930s had become ‘geriatric’ industries by
the 1950s exhibiting all the features of X-inefficiency which might be expected
from such a prolonged period of protection.  In the mid-1950s there were high
unemployment and emigration rates, especially in and from rural areas.
Consequently employment has always been seen as a key indicator of the
success or failure of Ireland’s industrial strategy and the regional distribution of
companies and employment has been constantly monitored.  In the past decade,
policy has focused on other attributes of FDI, in particular on profits,
technology, and linkages.  Nonetheless employment remains the key variable for
measuring policy success or failure.
Automatic and Discretionary Policies
Pro-active policy has taken two major forms:  fiscal and financial.
Initially the main element in the fiscal policy for foreign manufacturing
companies was an automatic tax holiday on the profits from all new export
sales.
4  When introduced in the mid-1950s, the tax holiday was given for ten
years but this was subsequently extended to fifteen years with a further five
                                               
4  Since the 1970s, other fiscal policies have facilitated foreign companies in obtaining cost-effective
tax-based financing on the Irish market.  In some cases the impact of these policies have had a very
significant impact on attracting foreign companies to locate in Ireland.5
years of partial relief;  the holiday was set to terminate in 1990.  Prior to 1990,
however, Ireland was forced by the European Commission to alter the policy for
new firms, as the tax holiday created a bias towards exports which was
incompatible with the Treaty of Rome.  Since 1982, all new firms have been
entitled to an automatic preferential corporate tax rate of 10 % which has
applied to all profits and not merely those arising from export sales.
5  Given the
small size of the Irish market and Ireland’s membership of the European
Economic Community (EEC) from 1973, Ireland’s attractiveness for foreign
companies lies in its being an investment base for exporting, especially for extra-
EEC/EC/EU companies.  Consequently the switch to a trade-neutral incentive
away from a pro-exporting incentive had little effect on firms’ sales behaviour,
with exporting remaining the driving force behind the investment of foreign-
owned firms in Irish manufacturing.
Financial supports for foreign firms locating in Ireland in the 1950s were
primarily in the form of cash grants towards the cost of the plant and machinery
which would be used to produce goods for export markets.
6  As with the tax
holiday, the basis for grant eligibility had to be changed in 1982, so that the
grants now apply to all manufacturing firms and not merely those which are
exporting.
7  By contrast with the fiscal incentives which were available to all
firms automatically, these were discretionary grants, available up to certain
maxima (determined by legislation) and implemented at the discretion of the
Industrial Development Authority (IDA).  While the discretionary option was
                                               
5  This compares with the standard rate of corporate tax which has been reduced gradually from 50 %
in the 1970s to 36 % in 1997.
6  While companies were not totally prohibited from selling on the domestic market, they could not do
so using grant-aided equipment and the return to domestic sales was significantly lower because of
the high rate of corporation tax such profits attracted (circa 50 %).
7  Additional assistance in the form of training grants, subsidised rents, technology-transfer supports,
etc. have also formed part of the policy package and in the case of some projects the training grants
can be an important component of the total financial support given.6
rarely if ever exercised in the 1950s and 1960s, in the sense that the maximum
grant was virtually always paid out, it has had a lasting effect on industrial policy
in Ireland, in that for over forty years industrial policy has always operated at
project level.
8   This issue is discussed further in the next section.
It is worth noting that, compared to other countries, Ireland has had a
rather different approach to FDI, in positively promoting greenfield, export-
orientated manufacturing investments in such a way that indigenous firms were
in a sense “protected” from direct competition with local FDI firms on the home
market.
9  By contrast, those semi-developed and developing countries which
began to promote FDI positively in the 1960s based their strategies on attracting
FDI specifically to produce for the local market which was typically protected
by high tariffs and other trade barriers.  In effect, these countries were adopting
the very strategy which Ireland had ruled out in the 1930s, namely of allowing
FDI companies to partake in the growth induced in domestic production by tariff
walls.  More recently, the economies of Eastern Europe seem to be preoccupied
with attracting FDI to take over existing ‘brown-field’ plants rather than to
establish new greenfield plants.  Furthermore, while Ireland is not unusual in
Europe today in promoting FDI, in the 1950s when it introduced this policy,
most countries in Western Europe were at best indifferent towards FDI.
Policy Certainty
Thus the primary characteristics of the Irish FDI strategy are its
employment focus, and its promotional approach combining automatic fiscal
                                               
8  While in many countries intervention is increasingly made at a project level, in the 1950s and 1960s
this was extremely rare, except in, say, the nationalised industries in the UK.  Such intervention as
occurred was only likely in the case of extremely large projects, whereas in Ireland, the smallest of
projects was analysed and evaluated for grant purposes.
9  While this protection effectively disappeared when the tax holiday came to an end, it is still the case
that grants will not be given to firms which are clearly going to add to competition on the domestic
market.7
incentives with discretionary grants.  A further additional characteristic worthy
of note is the emphasis on certainty.  Recognising the negative effects of
uncertainty on investment, the Irish system has always attempted to give as
much certainty as possible to the incoming and established investor through
policy continuity.  The continuity in policy has been possible primarily because
there is widespread consensus in Ireland on the strategy of promoting FDI and
on the use of the financial and fiscal incentives in that process - by and large
there is no major political debate on the fundamental issues and consequently
policy has remained broadly unchanged over long periods.  With regards to
fiscal incentives, certainty is achieved by providing the investing firms with a
long and certain time horizon.  Thus, for example, firms locating in Ireland in the
1960s were given a fifteen year tax holiday and those locating in the 1980s were
assured that the corporate tax system which they would face would be
unchanged until 2000; in 1990 this was extended to 2010.  Furthermore, the
ending of the tax holiday was ‘grand-parented’ so that individual firms who had
been given tax-holiday status were able to hold onto it, despite the changes for
new firms after 1982.  Promotional FDI fiscal policies are essentially
independent of the annual budgetary process and of changes in government.
10
With regards to financial policies, uncertainty on the part of firms has been
minimised by the payment of the cash grant up-front, with repayment required if
the firm fails to meet its agreed employment objectives.  The government’s
money is secured by linking the payment to fixed assets lest the project fail.
This gives certainty and security to both investor and government.
11  In effect,
                                               
10  Where changes have been made, such as the reduction in the rates of asset depreciation for tax
purposes as rates of inflation declined in the late 1980s, these have been pre-announced and done in
a very steady and gradual way, minimising uncertainty for firms.
11  Since the policies are operated in a discretionary manner, firms do not know precisely what grant
they can expect to get until the negotiations with the IDA are complete, but they have the advantage
of dealing with one agency in a centralised system so that at the earliest possible date they are in a
position to know what support they can expect.8
there is a commitment across the whole system to make the FDI policy work and
generate as much policy certainty in the system as possible.
Section III: Characteristics of Implementation
We have drawn a distinction between the characteristics of policy and
the characteristics of implementation because we feel that this distinction can be
important to understanding the success and out-turn of policy.  Indeed policy can
have quite different effects depending on how precisely it is implemented.
While different governments offer various investment incentives, as listed by
Yuill et al. (1995), it is widely recognised that the decision to invest in one
country rather than another is influenced by a complex set of factors, many of
which materialise during the actual implementation of policy.
Financial Incentives and Factor Choice
One example of how the operation of policy impacts can be seen by
looking at how the capital grants influence factor choice.  As noted above, when
the grant policy was introduced, it operated as a straight capital grant, i.e., an
exporting firm entitled to a grant of 50 % towards the cost of machinery would
receive that 50 % grant on receipt by the agency of proof that the machine had
been purchased and was in operation.  Gradually the grant system came to be
operated in a more discretionary manner, partly in response to criticism that such
an incentive was capital-biased and hence inappropriate.  The amount of grant
money given was influenced by the number of jobs expected to be created;  it
was then expressed in terms of a capital grant rate to the cost of machinery (say
45 %) and paid out as before when the machine was purchased and put into
operation.  Following further criticisms that capital bias was still possible
because firms had an incentive to exaggerate the number of jobs which they
expected to generate, limits were set in terms of both grant per unit capital and9
grant per unit labour.  Also, while grants were still paid out in relation to capital
purchases, firms were legally contracted to repay grants if they did not reach
their stated employment target.  Thus while Ireland might appear to have had the
same grant policy since the early 1950s, changes in how it is implemented have
considerably altered its effects.
Project Selection
As noted in Section 2, Irish policy has always operated at project level
and has become increasingly proactive and selective since the 1970s.  While
good projects in virtually all sectors of internationally-tradable economic
activity, with the exception of the tourism secotr, are in principle eligible for
support, not only has the level of grant support varied, but resources have been
increasingly deployed in the IDA to select potential projects on a strategic basis.
The first stage of this selection involves identifying high-growth market niches,
in which projects are internationally mobile (footloose) and in which Ireland
could provide a reasonably competitive base;  the second stage seeks to discover
the strong companies which are operating in those niches and which might be
considering diversifying their production internationally.
12  The third stage
requires locating project executives in those countries which are seen as
potential sources of such FDI projects in order to initiate contacts with the
companies identified in the second stage.  Finally, the fourth stage involves
getting the company to visit Ireland in the context of a specific project proposal.
                                               
12  In a sense IDA personnel were collecting and responding to market information about particular
firms which were likely to expand.  Implicit in their approach to looking at potential foreign
investment was the kind of framework developed by Dunning (1988), who suggests that foreign
investment depends on (i) special firm characteristics which enable companies to produce profitably
abroad, (ii) an incentive to internalise this advantage, and (iii) location characteristics in the host
countries.  IDA Ireland's approach involves (i) identifying industries (and firms) which had the
ability to profitably locate in foreign locations, (ii) considering the means of how this foreign
involvement could be achieved (in general through FDI), and (iii) analysing whether Ireland could
offer locational advantages for these particular industries (and firms).10
The precise pattern of FDI projects which come to Ireland is strongly influenced
by this process.
Bargaining
The fact that grant supports have been discretionary up to a maximum
means that all FDI projects involve bargaining between project executives and
potential investors.  While foreign project investors argue for more grants on the
basis of the attractiveness of alternative international investment locations, Irish
project executives limit the grants they offer on the basis of a form of cost-
benefit analysis, which considers factors such as employment potential and
location of the projects within Ireland.  The grant maxima ensure that the amount
of assistance given is bounded and when the absolute amount of the capital grant
support exceeds £2.5million the grant support requires Cabinet approval.
13  All
grant payments are in the public domain so that transparency is assured about
the final payment but not the process of arriving at it.
These discretionary grants combine very effectively with the automatic
fiscal incentives, which in turn are backed by a carefully negotiated set of double
tax agreements to maximise the benefit of the tax incentives to FDI companies.
14
Sectoral Selectivity
With regard to sectoral selectivity, in the 1970s the IDA identified the
electronics and pharmaceutical sectors as providing the most promising
opportunities for foreign investment projects for Ireland.  Furthermore, the US
                                               
13  For firms with large employment training grants, there is a maximum also subject to Cabinet review.
14  Double tax agreements are very important in this context, since the value of a tax incentive against
corporate tax in the host country depends crucially on how it is viewed by the tax authorities in the
home country.  Comparing tax incentives with other incentives, various surveys have concluded that
the tax incentives are the most important incentive encouraging manufacturing investors to locate in
Ireland.  For example, a recent Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu survey indicated that almost 60 % of
foreign companies interviewed found the ten % rate to have been very influential in their location
choice.  Furthermore, IDA Ireland personnel would suggest that tax incentives are particularly
popular with US firms.11
was identified as the most likely market source for such projects.  The creation
of industrial clusters has been central to policy and particular sub-sectors of
electronics and pharmaceuticals have been heavily targeted for over twenty
years; since the late 1980s and early 1990s this targeting has begun to yield very
significant benefits especially with US companies (see Section 4).
15  The present
sectoral strategy for the manufacturing sector is to consolidate on building
clusters in the electronics and pharmaceutical sectors and to promote out-
sourcing linkages with domestic firms in these sectors.  In addition, within
existing sectors executives are mandated to seek to promote the location of
head-quarter and R&D functions in Ireland.  This is seen as important from the
point of view of achieving high- income jobs and of encouraging a deepening of
the firms' commitment to Ireland.  Finally, increasing resources have been
devoted in recent years to promoting FDI in internationally-traded services,
discussion of which lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Section 4: Impact of FDI in Ireland
We now turn to look at some empirical measures of the significance and
impact of foreign direct investment on the Irish economy.  Table 1 shows shares
of net output, employment and exports by sector for 1993.  Over two thirds of
total net output in manufacturing in 1993 was accounted for by foreign-owned
companies, with the share of total net output generated by foreign-owned
companies varying quite considerably by sector.  This variability is to be
expected, both because of differences in the degree of international mobility of
investments across sectors and because of the selective way in which policy is
implemented.  Looking at sectors, we find that this share ranges from less than
                                               
15  For example, recent high profile investors in Ireland, such as Intel, Hewlett Packard, and IBM have
been targeted by IDA for more than a decade, with regular presentations, etc.  This points to the long
lead time required to realise the benefits of such a strategy and the fact that the success in this area
has been heavily influenced by the method of implementation.12
20 % in Non-metallic Minerals to over 90 % in Chemicals and in the high-tech
sub-sectors of Metals & Engineering (M&E), namely, Electrical & Electronic
and Instruments.  As discussed above, these are exactly the sectors targeted by
Ireland's industrial policy.
One might argue that the output data over-state the significance of the
value-added of foreign-owned companies.  To the extent that companies
understate the value of inputs used and overstate the value of the sales
generated, this measure overstates the  importance of FDI companies in real
activity in manufacturing.  Firms may try to artificially raise their net output
figures in Ireland by engaging in transfer pricing in order to transfer profits to
Ireland (Foley, 1991).  The employment figures reported in the table can be seen
as giving a more conservative measure of the significance of foreign firms.
The overall share of foreign firms in total manufacturing employment is
44 %, less than two thirds the share of net output.  The foreign share of net
output by sector exceeds the foreign share of employment in all but one sector
showing a similar but not identical pattern.  These differences could be due to (i)
differences in sectoral activities, (ii) differences in factor intensities in the same
sectoral activity, resulting in foreign firms being less labour intensive than
indigenous firms, or (iii) transfer pricing.  Nevertheless, the employment figures
appear to confirm the importance of the high-tech sectors.  Unfortunately the
level of sectoral dis-aggregation does not enable us to compute the values for the
sub-sectors of M&E.
Table 1 also shows the export ratios for foreign-owned and indigenous
manufacturing companies by broad industrial sector.  Foreign-owned firms have
considerably higher export ratios than indigenous firms, with over 85 % of the
gross output of foreign firms being exported - two and a half times the
comparable figure for indigenous firms.  Note that the export ratios in foreign-13
owned companies are close to 90 % in most of the manufacturing sectors; only
foreign companies in the Food, Drink & Tobacco, Non-metallic Minerals and
Miscellaneous sectors appear to serve the local market to any great extent.
Sources of Foreign Companies
As discussed above, employment creation has been the overriding focus
of Ireland's industrial strategy and the figures in Table 2 suggest that this aspect
of the strategy has been successful.  While manufacturing employment in Irish-
owned firms decreased by approximately 19 % between 1975 and 1995,
employment in foreign-owned firms increased by some 27 % during the same
period.  Both effects sum up to a net decrease in manufacturing employment of
roughly 3 %, in a period when manufacturing employment in the EU declined by
more than 20 % (European Commission, 1996).
Looking at the source of foreign investment, Table 2 shows that the US
was by far the biggest investor in Ireland in 1995, with more than half of the
employment in foreign-owned firms being in US-owned firms. Employment in
US firms has almost trebled between 1975 and 1995, lending some support to
the conclusion that the policy of attracting FDI projects from the US has been
successful over the last twenty years.  This success is evident in Ireland's
increasing its "market share" of US investment in manufacturing industries
(measured in terms of capital expenditures by US affiliates) in the EU from 2.6
% in 1983 to 5.8 % in 1994 (Ruane and Görg, 1996a).  Employment in
companies originating in other non-European countries has also increased
considerably since 1975, though it still only accounts for a relatively small share
of total employment in Irish manufacturing industries.  In the remainder of
Section 4, we focus on the employment performance of European companies in
Ireland, and our analysis indicates different trends in the pattern of investment by
different European nationalities.  We distinguish three nationality groups, namely14
the UK, Germany, and a group "other-European".
16  Fig. 1 complements the
analysis in Table 2 by showing annual employment figures by nationality.
Employment in German firms increased relatively modestly between
1975 and 1985 (by around 1,500), but grew by 2,100 between 1986 and 1995.
This represents a total increase in employment of more than 50 % between 1975
and 1995 and suggests that German firms have responded positively to both
Ireland's accession to the EEC in 1973 and to the impact of the European Single
Market Programme in the late 1980s.  The availability of a relatively cheap and
skilled labour force and of relatively generous investment incentives has always
made Ireland attractive to German investors, and this attractiveness was
enhanced by Ireland membership of the European market.  On the other hand,
employment in companies from other European countries shows a more volatile
development.  It increased between 1975 and 1982 by approximately 500, but
decreased by roughly 3,000 between 1983 and 1986.  Since then it has stabilised
at around 14,000.  This trend may indicate that in a more integrated European
market, Ireland has lost part of its attraction for investors from other continental
European countries beside Germany.
In contrast to the firms from continental Europe, UK-owned firms show
a much more dramatic development - employment has declined by over 50 %
since 1975.  The fall in employment of approximately 13,000 between 1975 and
1985 is not surprising given the impact of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area
Agreement in 1965.  Ireland's high tariffs had not only protected indigenous
firms, but also a large number of UK firms which had established in Ireland prior
to 1932.  The introduction of the Free Trade Area removed the need to maintain
plants in Ireland in order to serve the Irish market competitively - this could now
                                               
16  As regards this nationality group, note that investment from non-EU European countries is virtually
non-existent in Ireland.  Therefore, one can think of the 'other European' group as investment from
continental EU countries other than Germany.15
be achieved through exports from the UK.  The dramatic decrease in
employment in UK firms in this period can, therefore, be mainly attributed to
such firms exiting from production in Ireland.  Between 1986 and 1995,
employment in UK firms decreased by a further 4,000, indicating that the
downward trend has slowed down.
Sectoral Composition of Employment
We now turn to look at the sectoral composition of employment in
European companies in Ireland.  Following the policy orientation towards high-
tech industries, most closely measured here by the M&E and Chemicals sectors,
we would expect employment in these sectors to have grown particularly
strongly.  Table 3 shows the sectoral breakdown of employment in European
firms in Ireland.  Particularly noteworthy is that almost 80 % of employment in
German firms in 1995 was concentrated in the M&E sector and that employment
in this sector more than doubled between 1975 and 1995.  The remaining
employment is spread across the other sectors.  By contrast, employment in
firms from other European countries is less concentrated and spread across the
Chemicals (20 %) and the M&E (33 %) sectors.  Employment in the latter sector
actually fell over the period while employment in Chemicals increased by
approximately 50 %.  Thus, as measured in terms of employment, the  response
of German firms in the M&E sector and other European firms in the Chemicals
sector is in line with  Irish industrial strategy.
Employment in UK-owned firms shows a sectoral breakdown which is
very different from the continental European countries.  The sectoral spread is
much less concentrated in both 1975 and 1995, and such concentration as occurs
is in the Food and Drink & Tobacco sectors, which accounted for almost 50 %
of jobs in UK-owned firms in 1995.  This reflects the significance of long-
standing UK firms and of Irish raw material resources for UK firms in those16
sectors.  Indeed, as we concluded elsewhere (Ruane and Görg, 1996), the
experience for the UK companies over this period resembles much more that of
Irish-owned firms than of other foreign-owned firms in Ireland.
Composition of Employment Change
Thus far, we have compared employment figures in 1975 and 1995,
which provided us with a snap-shot at particular points of time.  However, such
an analysis cannot reflect the full extent of changes taking place within particular
sectors over the period between the two benchmark years.  Industrial policies
can be expected to have some effects on job gains but only a weaker influence
on the employment stock, since the latter reflects the impact of past history and
policies.  To take some account of these dynamics, we now turn to look at job
gains and losses across manufacturing sectors.  A sector can show job gains and
job losses in the same year due to (i) firms that expand (through firm entry or
firm expansion) and (ii) firms that contract employment (through exit or
contractions) over the same period.  Thus, our measure of job gains includes all
new jobs generated in firms in sector j over a given period (whether or not they
still existed at the end of the period) while the measure of job losses includes all
jobs lost in firms in the same sector over the same period.  Net job change is the
summation of job gains and job losses in a given sector.  The data on job gains
and losses per firm are compiled annually at firm level by the data collecting
agency, and we aggregate these for the period 1975 to 1995.  To put it formally,
we calculate
gains: g g j ji
i
=￿ (1)
losses: l l j ji
i
=￿ (2)
net: ( ) ( ) g l g l j j ji ji
i
- = - ￿ , { } i ˛ 76 77 95 , ,..., (3)17
Note that the first gains and losses are reported in 1976, since 1975 is our base
year.
17
The data in Table 4 indicate that, relative to 1975 or 1995 stocks, there
have been huge job gains and losses over the analysed period.  In order to
compare the employment performance for different nationalities we generate two
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The  A measure expresses job gains relative to the employment base in
1975, which allows us to benchmark the extent of job creation across countries
that started from very different employment bases in 1975.  The B measure
expresses the net job change relative to job gains which can yield some insights
into the relationship between gross and net job creation, i.e., whether or not
gross gains translated into persistent net job creations.
The large numbers of total job gains and losses in Table 4 indicate
considerable activity of job generation and destruction taking place which is not
reflected in the net figures of employment change in Table 3.  In the nationality
comparison it is apparent that, of the three nationality groups, German firms
have both the highest A  and B ratios, while the UK has the lowest ratios in both
cases.  The B ratio of -0.93 for UK firms in fact indicates that the job losses
                                               
17  Note also that the calculation of job gains and losses is not readily comparable to the calculation of
gross flows of jobs as introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and used recently by, for example,
Konings et al. (1996).  In particular, the two indicators described below are different from the
measures used in those papers.18
were almost twice as high as job gains (-1 would indicate that job losses were
double the job gains).
It is also evident that job gains and losses were not uniform across
manufacturing sectors.  UK firms show net job reductions in all manufacturing
sectors;  despite the quite considerable job gains in the M&E and Chemicals
sectors, the job losses by far exceeded even in these sectors.  The  A measure
indicates that the job gains compared with the base employment in 1975 were
among the highest in the M&E and Chemicals sectors, while they also show
some of the highest values for  B  (though they are still very low compared with
the other countries).  This suggests, to some extent, that the policy measures did
result in job gains in the M&E and Chemicals sectors, though, in the case of UK
firms, these were more than outweighed by job losses.
The figures are quite different for firms from continental European
countries.  German firms have the highest job gains in the M&E sector (around
75 %) and also a relatively high number of job gains in the Chemicals sector.
Also, the A measure shows that the gains relative to base employment in 1975 is
relatively high especially in the M&E sectors, which indicates a high rate of job
creation above the base employment in 1975.  While the figures suggest that
German-owned firms have invested relatively strongly in the sectors which
proxy high-tech, they also show that these sectors accounted for some of the
highest job losses in German firms in Ireland.  Nonetheless, the B ratio is still
positive, i.e., the  gross gains have translated into net gains.  These results
remind us that these sectors are not only innovative growth sectors, but also
relatively risky sectors.  It also points to the danger of having policies which are
aimed only at generating new jobs without reference to the sustainability of
those jobs.19
In the case of firms stemming from other continental European countries,
we can also see that the bulk of job gains accrued in the M&E and Chemicals
sectors, although considerable job losses are recorded in these sectors as well.
Note that the Chemicals sector has the highest B ratio for other European firms,
i.e., the gross job gains translated into the highest net job gains in this sector.
Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that the investment incentives
offered in Ireland appear to have led to significant gross job gains in the targeted
high-tech sectors, as proxied here by the M&E and Chemicals sectors.
However, these gross gains have not necessarily translated into net gains of
anything like the same magnitude.  This result might be misleading due to the
high level of sectoral aggregation used;  a further sectoral dis-aggregation might
indicate that the job gains were in different sub-sectors to the job losses.  For
example, it may be the case that job gains occurred in the electronics and
pharmaceuticals sub-sectors of M&E and Chemicals respectively, while the job
losses may have occurred in the more traditional sub-sectors, such as mechanical
engineering or basic industrial chemicals.  Unfortunately, the data here do not
allow us to analyse this issue.
Section V: Current Concerns
Ireland’s recent success in winning large-scale FDI projects from the US
has led to renewed concern in some quarters that the country is becoming too
dependent on FDI. The fact that indigenous companies appear to be prospering
at present with increasing employment and profits rates has reduced concerns
about ‘crowding out’, so that the attitude to FDI is not hostile in any way but
simply marks a concern with dependency per se - the “what would happen if
FDI globally declined” scenario.  Of perhaps more significant concern is the
dependency on the US market, as the portfolio of investment sources has
concentrated dramatically over the years.  That concern is somewhat20
counteracted by recognition of the real attractiveness of Ireland as a base for US
investment in Europe and the scale and dynamism of the US economy at present.
As noted above, Ireland was well ahead of the field in introducing
incentives to encourage FDI in the 1950s and 1960s.  Now governments
throughout the world, and of particular relevance to Ireland, EU governments are
promoting FDI projects by means of a range of incentives, typically offered by
agencies at sub-national levels.
18  Thus the relative impact of Ireland’s incentives
has been eroded over the past decade.  Although hitherto there is not much
evidence of direct competition from Eastern Europe, where foreign direct
investment appears to be going more into existing commercial activities rather
than into new projects, one can expect that this situation is unlikely to continue
as existing opportunities get taken up and as EU membership becomes a reality
for these countries.  The implications of these developments have been
recognised in Ireland (Forfás, 1996), reinforcing the search for projects which
build on comparative national advantage as well as lower basic wage costs and
fiscal and financial incentives.
It also seems inevitable that the increasing use of incentives to attract
FDI projects across EU countries will soon receive more attention from the
European Commission - at present only minimal attention is paid to it in
connection with Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome.  In this context, another
problem in the future may be the possible loss of Ireland's status of a less-
favoured region within the EU.  Furthermore, clarification of the future of the 10
% corporate tax rate, due to terminate in 2010, is now essential - in industrial
policy terms Ireland has benefited enormously from having a stable investment
environment in the past.
                                               
18  Arguably for larger countries the sub-national level is the appropriate level for such intervention
though it generates the possibility that one region in an economy is bidding for a project against
another region.  This phenomenon is already apparent in the EU.21
Table 1: Significance of foreign firms for the Irish Economy, 1993























27.6% 52.5% 23.2% 29.0% 38.5% 72.4%
Textiles 1.7% 63.5% 5.0% 61.8% 46.2% 93.0%
Clothing &
Footwear
1.5% 37.2% 5.6% 26.0% 46.4% 89.9%
Timber & Furniture 0.8% 24.0% 4.4% 4.3% 16.1%* 93.2%*
Paper & Printing 11.7% 60.8% 6.8% 12.6%
Chemicals 22.7% 94.3% 8.3% 78.9% 26.2% 96.3%
Non-metallic
Minerals
3.0% 15.7% 5.0% 24.0% 20.0% 66.9%
Metals &
Engineering
25.7% 78.3% 36.1% 62.5% 48.6% 86.6%
    of which:
 -  Electric &
Electronic
12.8% 92.2% 49.8% 88.2%
 -  Instruments 4.8% 90.0% 80.0% 94.4%
 -  Transport
Equipment
1.8% 30.6% 36.3% 95.2%
 -  Other 6.4% 54.8% 36.1% 91.1%
Miscellaneous 5.2% 56.8% 5.8% 37.1% 34.2% 74.6%
Total Manufacturing 100.0% 68.4% 100.0% 44.7% 35.2% 87.7%
Note:  * export ratio is for sectors 'timber and furniture' and 'paper and printing' combined
Source: Own estimations based on preliminary data on output and exports from the Central
Statistics Office and on employment data from the Forfás Employment Survey22
Table 2: Total Employment by nationality, 1975-1995
Nationality 1975 1995 change
1975-95
absolute in % of
Total
absolute in % of
Total
Ireland 143387 65.7% 116273 55.1% -18.9%
UK 29669 13.6% 12260 5.8% -58.7%
Germany 6074 2.8% 9700 4.6% 59.7%
Other European 17776 8.1% 13929 6.6% -21.6%
US 18418 8.4% 51615 24.4% 180.2%
Other non-
European
2997 1.4% 7395 3.5% 146.7%
Total Foreign 74934 34.3% 94899 44.9% 26.6%
Total 218321 100.0% 211172 100.0% -3.3%
Source: Own estimations based on data from the Forfás Employment Survey.Table 3: Sectoral breakdown of employment by nationality, 1975-1995
Sector 1975 1995
Nationality UK Germany other European UK Germany other European
Food 4,932 16.6% 34 0.6% 4,108 23.1% 3,262 26.6% 386 4.0% 1,868 13.4%
Drink & Tobacco 5,862 19.8% 0 0.0% 1,208 6.8% 2,759 22.5% 56 0.6% 803 5.8%
Textiles 2,986 10.1% 201 3.3% 1,206 6.8% 831 6.8% 219 2.3% 957 6.9%
Clothing &
Footwear
3,971 13.4% 533 8.8% 806 4.5% 731 6.0% 79 0.8% 956 6.9%
Timber & Furniture 135 0.5% 308 5.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 201 1.4%
Paper & Printing 820 2.8% 108 1.8% 319 1.8% 386 3.1% 63 0.6% 83 0.6%
Chemicals 2,201 7.4% 647 10.7% 1,941 10.9% 1,651 13.5% 824 8.5% 2,839 20.4%
Non-metallic
minerals
2,032 6.8% 422 6.9% 506 2.8% 762 6.2% 75 0.8% 290 2.1%
Metals &
Engineering
4,525 15.3% 3,620 59.6% 6,801 38.3% 1,330 10.8% 7,670 79.1% 4,522 32.5%
Miscellaneous 2,205 7.4% 201 3.3% 881 5.0% 548 4.5% 328 3.4% 1,410 10.1%
Total 29,669 100.0% 6,074 100.0% 17,776 100.0% 12,260 100.0% 9,700 100.0% 13,929 100.0%
Source: Own estimations based on data from the Forfás Employment Survey.23
Table 4: Job gains and losses by nationality and sector, 1975-1995
Nationality UK Germany other European
Sector Gains Losses Net Gains Losses Net Gains Losses Net
Food 3226 -4896 -1670 609 -257 352 2774 -5014 -2240
Drink & Tobacco 1489 -4592 -3103 64 -8 56 873 -1278 -405
Textiles 1712 -3867 -2155 444 -426 18 2294 -2543 -249
Clothing &
Footwear
3212 -6452 -3240 873 -1327 -454 2718 -2568 150
Timber & Furniture 117 -252 -135 198 -506 -308 287 -86 201
Paper & Printing 515 -949 -434 152 -197 -45 166 -402 -236
Chemicals 1921 -2471 -550 901 -724 177 3662 -2764 898
Non-metallic
minerals
1022 -2292 -1270 237 -584 -347 235 -451 -216
Metals &
Engineering
4366 -7561 -3195 12096 -8,046 4050 8772 -11051 -2279
Miscellaneous 1159 -2816 -1657 623 -496 127 2245 -1716 529
Total 18739 -36148 -17409 16197 -12571 3626 24026 -27873 -3847
Source: Own estimations based on data from the Forfás Employment Survey.24
Table 5: Employment indicators by nationality and sector, 1975-1995







Food 0.65 17.91 0.68 -0.52 0.58 -0.81
Drink & Tobacco 0.25 0.00 0.72 -2.08 0.88 -0.46
Textiles 0.57 2.21 1.90 -1.26 0.04 -0.11
Clothing &
Footwear
0.81 1.64 3.37 -1.01 -0.52 0.06
Timber & Furniture 0.87 0.64 0.00 -1.15 -1.56 0.70
Paper & Printing 0.63 1.41 0.52 -0.84 -0.30 -1.42
Chemicals 0.87 1.39 1.89 -0.29 0.20 0.25
Non-metallic
minerals
0.50 0.56 0.46 -1.24 -1.46 -0.92
Metals &
Engineering
0.96 3.34 1.29 -0.73 0.33 -0.26
Miscellaneous 0.53 3.10 2.55 -1.43 0.20 0.24
Total 0.63 2.67 1.35 -0.93 0.22 -0.16
Note: The very high value of A in the sector food is due to the fact that in 1975 German 
firms in the food sector accounted for only 34 jobs.
Source: Own estimations based on data from the Forfás Employment Survey.25
Fig. 1: Employment by nationality, 1975-1995























































































































Source: Own estimations based on data from the Forfás Employment Survey.26
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